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Abstract. In addition to purely practical values, there are cognitive values which figure in
scientific deliberations. One way of introducing cognitive values is to consider the cognitive
value that accrues to the act of accepting a hypothesis. Although such values may have a
role to play in the matter of theory acceptance, this does not exhaust their significance in
scientific decision-making. This paper makes a plea for the consideration of epistemic value—
cognitive value that attaches to a state of belief. I defend the notion of cognitive epistemic
value against criticisms that have been raised against it. A stability requirement for epistemic
value-functions is argued for on the basis of considerations of diachronic coherence. This
requirement is sufficient for proving the Value of Learning Theorem, which says that the
expected utility of cost-free learning cannot be negative. Under the assumption of stability,
the expected cognitive epistemic value of undergoing a learning experience must also be
non-negative.
1. Varieties of Theory Choice
Discussions of theory choice in science frequently cite theoretical, or cognitive virtues as
relevant to theory assessment. Kuhn’s well-known list includes accuracy, consistency, scope,
simplicity, and fruitfulness (Kuhn, 1977). Explanatory capacity is also commonly cited as a
theoretical virtue.
Virtues such as these are desirable features; we would like our theories to have them.
Having said that, the question arises as to what, if any, legitimate roles these virtues may
play in scientific deliberations. If we regard theories that have these desirable features as,
ceteris paribus, more credible than theories that lack them, this smacks of wishful thinking.
If we reject this, is there any legitimate role for them to play at all?
The phrase “theory choice,” which often occurs in such discussions, obscures the rather
obvious and commonplace fact that there are a number of distinct choices that we can
make with regards to theories. Compare, for instance, choosing which theory one regards
as most credible (or most likely to be either true or approximately true), with the choice
of which theory to devote research effort to. These are distinct choices, to which different
considerations apply. Credibility of a theory is not the only consideration relevant to the
question of choice of research programme; one might even decide to devote one’s efforts to
what one regards as a ‘long shot,’ if the possible benefits, tangible or cognitive, that would
accrue should the work pan out are high enough.
Discussions of theory choice vary in explicitness about what sorts of decisions are involved,
and, as a consequence, lists of criteria for theory choice sometimes include criteria relevant
to different sorts of choice. This definitely seems to be the case for Kuhn’s list.1 This can
1 This is also the case for Longino’s proposed supplementation to that list (Longino,
1995). Longino is explicit that her list combines criteria relevant to at least three distinct
choices: theory construction, theory acceptance or rejection, and (borrowing a term from
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2result in it not being clear whether a given author is making a claim that cognitive values
play a legitimate role in assessing the credibility of a theory—a claim that would rightly
be regarded as controversial—or the much less controversial claim that they may play a
legitimate role in other decisions, such as the decision of what line of research to pursue.
One decision a scientist may make is the decision whether to accept a hypothesis. This,
it seems, is a decision that ineliminably involves values, as was famously argued long ago
by Rudner (1953). One way to make explicit the role of values in acceptance-decisions is
to model the decision as one of maximizing expected utility. In addition to considerations
of practical gain or cost, cognitive utility may be weighed in the balance. The idea is that
knowledge can be regarded as an end in itself, and that acceptance of a true theory may have
value that extends beyond instrumental value. This opens up the possibility that acceptance
of a theory that has some virtue—e.g. explanatory power—might be more valuable than
acceptance of one that lacks that virtue. That is, if h1 is a theory that, if true, affords
greater understanding than h2 would, if true, then one might regard acceptance of h1, if it
is true, as having higher cognitive utility than acceptance of h2 if it is true. This, in turn,
will be relevant to choice of research programme; it may make sense to investigate theories
of high explanatory power, not because one regards them as inherently more credible, but
because of the greater cognitive utility that would be realized should the investigation lead
to acceptance of the theory.2
Denote by Ah the act of accepting a hypothesis h, and let u(X|h) be the utility of doing
X if h is true, u(X| ∼ h), the utility of doing X if h is false. Then the expected utility of
accepting h, as judged by an agent whose utilities are represented by u and whose credences
are represented by a credence-function cr, is
U(Ah) = cr(h) u(Ah|h) + cr(∼ h) u(Ah| ∼ h).
The expected utility of not accepting h is
U(∼ Ah) = cr(h) u(∼ Ah|h) + cr(∼ h) u(∼ Ah| ∼ h).
An agent who maximizes utility will accept h if U(Ah) > U(∼ Ah). This makes the threshold
for accepting h—that is, how high cr(h) has to be in order to warrant acceptance of h—
depend explicitly on utilities; accepting h is favoured over not accepting it if and only if
cr(h)
cr(∼ h) >
u(∼ Ah| ∼ h)− u(Ah| ∼ h)
u(Ah|h)− u(∼ Ah|h) .
Alan Franklin), theory pursuit, the choice of which theories or theoretical frameworks to
work on.
2 A note on terminology. We will use the term cognitive utility, or cognitive value, for
value associated with cognitive goals such as knowledge or understanding, not stemming
from the consequences of practical decisions. Cognitive utilities may attach to the act of
acceptance, or to a belief state. Following Greaves and Wallace (2006), we will use the term
epistemic utility for a value attached to a belief state. A belief state may be evaluated in
terms of its effect on decisions, in which case we are concerned with practical epistemic
utilities. It is one goal of this paper to convince the reader that it is both permissible and
worthwhile to consider also cognitive epistemic utilities. Levi (1967) and Hempel (1981)
use the phrase “epistemic utility” for what we will call the cognitive utility attached to
acceptance. Sympathy is extended to any reader who finds the terminological variance in
the literature confusing.
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3An acceptance-based approach to cognitive utility has been developed by a number of
authors, notably Hempel (1965; 1981), Levi (1967), Maher (1993), and Douglas (2000). There
is much to be said for such an approach. In particular, it makes room for the relevance of
cognitive values to decisions regarding theory pursuit. Note that, though cognitive values
may play a role in a decision to accept a theory or to pursue it, these values need not affect
the agent’s credence in the theory, which may be based on the evidence, without any taint
of wishful thinking. Cognitive values function as values, not as surrogates for evidence.
2. Should Acceptance be Rejected?
There is a difficulty, however, with understanding, within a framework that represents belief
states as probability assignments, what role there is for a notion of acceptance or rejection
of hypotheses to play. This was the thrust of Jeffrey’s response to Rudner (Jeffrey, 1956). He
agrees with Rudner that, if it is the job of the scientist to accept or reject hypotheses, then
the scientist qua scientist must make value judgments. He then argues that the sensitivity of
criteria for acceptance or rejection to what is at stake makes an epistemic model that consists
of modelling the epistemic state of a scientist merely in terms of propositions accepted or
rejected too crude; one ought instead to treat of reasonable degrees of belief. On Jeffrey’s
approach, acceptance falls by the wayside.
If we do accept acceptance, should it be modelled as a change in belief state, say, a shift
to a belief state that assigns credence 1 to the accepted propositions? If so, then this is
a shift, in the absence of new evidence, away from the credence arrived at by considering
all evidence. This, as Earman puts it in his discussion of the issue, “is nothing short of
madness” (Earman, 1992, 194). If, however, acceptance is not a belief shift, this limits the
role it will play in the practice of science. Consider two agents, Peter and Richard. Peter
labels some hypotheses as accepted, whereas Richard employs no notion of acceptance. They
have the same credences and the same utilities, except for any purely cognitive utility that
Peter attaches to the act of acceptance. Since Peter and Richard have the same credences
and utilities, they make the same decisions, insofar as practical utlities are concerned. Any
impact that acceptance will have on decisions will stem from consideration of cognitive
utility associated with the act of acceptance itself. But if a belief state is represented by
a credence-function, then it is hard to see how Peter might be in an epistemically more
valuable state than Richard. Acceptance appears to be a wheel turning idly.
At the level of abstraction on which the discussion between Jeffrey and Rudner took
place, in which agents are idealized and cognitive limitations of agents are ignored, Jeffrey
is entirely correct. There is, however, a role, albeit a limited one, for a notion of acceptance
in a probabilistic account, when the picture is refined so as to take cognitive limitations
into account. It is too much to ask of an agent of limited cognitive resources to carry
around a full probability assignment in her head, for any rich set of propositions, and such
a thing could not be readily communicated. There will be cases, however, in which, though
an agent’s credence in a proposition is less than unity, this difference will have negligible
effect on decisions, and the agent, in any foreseeable situation, will act as if she accepts the
proposition as definitely true. In such a case, she would to do well to regard the proposition
as accepted, without worrying too much about what her credence in it ought to be. It will
also be simpler to report her attitude as one of acceptance, instead of trying to communicate
a credence-level. Note that these are cases in which the proposition is so well supported that
the sensitivity to what is at stake discussed by Rudner and Jeffrey is largely absent; it is only
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4in such cases that we wish to label some propositions accepted. This proposal is similar in
spirit to that of Sargent (2009), who, developing a suggestion of Frankish (2004), introduces
a notion of acceptance to relieve an agent of finite cognitive resources from the burden of
doing expected utility calculations in cases when the cost of doing the calculation would
exceed the benefit.
On any such approach to introducing acceptance into a context in which belief-states are
represented by probability functions, acceptance will play a fairly limited role, and will be
incapable of bearing the full burden that acceptance-based approaches to cognitive utility
require of it. Instead of looking only to cognitive utility that attaches to the act of acceptance
of a hypothesis, we should consider also epistemic utlities—utilities that attach to a state of
belief. This is an approach that has been advocated by, among others, Oddie (1997), Joyce
(1998), and Greaves and Wallace (2006). See Fallis (2007) for a superb overview.
3. Epistemic Utility
Though utility, cognitive or otherwise, has a role to play in any decision of whether to accept
a hypothesis, this does not exhaust the role of utility in a scientific context. An investigation
that leads to better-informed credences about a class of hypotheses may have value even
if it does not lead to acceptance of any of them, if it results in a belief state that leads to
better decisions or has some cognitive value above and beyond its impact on decisions. We
must, therefore, be prepared to talk about the value of a belief state.
In this paper, an agent’s state of belief will be represented by an assignment of numerical
degrees of belief, or credences, to a set of propositions. It will be assumed that these credence-
functions satisfy the axioms of probability. This is the basic starting point of probabilist
approaches to issues of theory confirmation. No claim is made as to psychological accuracy
of this picture. It should be noncontroversial that human beings do not possess precise
numerical degrees of belief. Moreover, our qualitative rankings of propositions as more or
less credible are often incompatible with the existence of numerical degrees of belief that
represent these qualitative rankings and satisfy the axioms of probability. Nevertheless, it
is possible to regard these facts about human beings as being attributable to our cognitive
limitations. We may regard the model of an agent that has numerical credences as a regulative
ideal : insofar as we depart from this model, this is to be regarded as a departure from ideal
rationality. If one becomes aware that one’s qualitative rankings of propositions as more or
less credible are incompatible with the existence of quantitative degrees of belief satisfying
the probability calculus, then one ought to regard such judgments as flawed and (if it
matters) attempt to mend them.
Example 1. To motivate the idea of the value of a state of belief, consider first the
following simple example. On Tuesday Bob is offered the option of purchasing tickets from
a deck of 100 tickets, labeled 1 through 100. The ticket numbered n costs n dollars, and
each ticket Bob purchases can be redeemed for a prize of 100 dollars on Wednesday, if it
rains that day. We assume that Bob has the funds to purchase as many tickets as he deems
fit, and that we can treat Bob’s utilities as being linear in money.
Suppose, now, that Bob has degree of belief p that it will rain tomorrow. Then he will
regard any ticket with price less than $100p as a good deal, and any ticket with price greater
than $100p as a bad deal (It matters little whether he chooses to buy a ticket with price
exactly equal to $100p, should there be one; we will assume that he does.) Let np be the
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5least integer less than or equal to 100p. In purchasing his tickets Bob expends a total of
np∑
n=1
n =
1
2
np(np + 1).
In the event of rain Wednesday, Bob wins all his bets, for total winnings of $100np, and so
his net gain is
Vr(p) = 100 np − 1
2
np(np + 1).
If it doesn’t rain, Bob has a net loss:
V∼r(p) = −1
2
np(np + 1).
Vr(p) is the value to Bob of having credence p in r, if r is true, and V∼r(p) is the value of
having that credence, if r is false.
Suppose, now, that Alice has degree of belief q in r. Then her assessment of the value
to Bob of having credence p in r is her expectation value of the reward to Bob; that is, a
weighted mean of Vr(p) and V∼r(p), where the weighting is her own credence:
U(p; q) = q Vr(p) + (1− q)V∼r(p).
This is equal to U(q; q) when np = nq (that is, when Bob makes exactly the same decisions
as Alice), and is less than U(q; q) if there are any tickets that Bob would buy and Alice
would not, or vice versa. Therefore, we have, for any p, q,
U(q; q) ≥ U(p; q).
Example 2. Suppose that we want to rate weather forecasters on their forecasting ability.
We devise the following scheme. Each forecaster is to state a probability p of rain the next
day, and be awarded p points if it rains, 1− p points if it doesn’t. This rewards high values
of p in the case of rain, low values in the case of no rain.
Though this may appear at first glance to be a good scoring rule, it is problematic,
because it gives forecasters incentive to “work the system” by reporting probabilities other
than their genuine degrees of belief. If Alice has degree of belief q that it will rain, then she
judges the expected points awarded, if she reports p, as
q p+ (1− q) (1− p) = (1− q) + (2q − 1)p.
If q = 1/2, all choices of p have the same expected reward. But if q > 1/2, Alice maximizes
her expected reward by choosing p = 1, and if q < 1/2, by choosing p = 0.
Example 3. A scoring rule that does not have this defect is the Brier rule (Brier, 1950).
We reward (1 − p)2 points if it rains, p2 points if it doesn’t rain, and count a low score as
better than a high one. The expected point-score for a forecaster who reports p, as judged
by an agent whose credence in rain is q, is
q(1− p)2 + (1− q)p2 = q(1− q) + (p− q)2,
which is obviously minimized by choosing p = q. Thus, forecasters will minimize their
expected score by reporting their actual degrees of belief. Scoring rules that have this feature
are called proper scoring rules.3
3 For some of the seminal work on proper scoring rules, see Good (1952), McCarthy
(1956), Savage (1971).
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6Let S be a set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive hypotheses {hi | i = 1, ..., n},
and let ΩS be the set of probability functions on S. An epistemic utility function V is an
assignment, to each hi ∈ S, of a function Vi : ΩS → R, where Vi(p) gives the value of having
credences p = (p1, p2, ..., pn) if the hypothesis hi is true. These might include, as in Example
1, concrete payoffs as a result of decisions made on the basis of those credences, or cognitive
values, or both. The expected utility to Bob of having credence-function p, as judged by
Alice, who has credence-function q, is
UV(p;q) =
n∑
i=1
qi Vi(p).
Following Greaves and Wallace (2006), let us say that a credence-function q is self-recommending
for V iff an agent with utilities V and credence-function q does not judge any other
credence-function to be more valuable than her own, that is, iff
UV(q;q) ≥ UV(p;q)
for all p ∈ ΩS . q is strictly self-recommending for V iff an agent with epistemic utility
function V and credence-function q judges every other credence-function to be strictly worse
than her own, that is, iff
UV(q;q) > UV(p;q)
for all p 6= q.4
An epistemic utility function V is (strictly) stable at p iff p is (strictly) self-recommending
for V; it is everywhere (strictly) stable iff it is (strictly) stable at every p ∈ ΩS . Everywhere
stable epistemic utility functions correspond to proper scoring rules.
We define the quantity ∆V(p;q) as the difference, as assessed by q, between the value of
q and the value of p.
∆V(p;q) = UV(q;q)− UV(p;q).
V is stable at q iff ∆V(p;q) ≥ 0 for all p, and strictly stable iff ∆V(p;q) > 0 for all
p 6= q.
Example 4. Generalized Brier rule. Let {ai} be positive numbers, and define
Vi(p) = −ai(1− pi)2 −
∑
j 6=i
aj p
2
j .
This gives
UV(p;q) = −
∑
i
ai
(
qi(1− qi) + (pi − qi)2
)
and
∆V(p;q) =
∑
i
ai(pi − qi)2.
Epistemic utility functions of this form are, therefore, everywhere strictly stable.
Example 5. One may want to consider epistemic utilities that depend only on the agent’s
degree of belief in the true hypothesis. It can be shown that, for n > 2, the only everywhere
stable epistemic utility functions that have this feature are those of the form
Vi(p) = ai + logb(pi),
4 Oddie (1997)’s term for a credence-function that is not self-recommending is “self-
defeating” (p. 537).
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7where {ai} is an arbitrary set of numbers, and b is any number greater than 1.5 Note that,
though Vi is a continuous function on the interior of ΩS , it is unbounded as pi → 0, and
so cannot be extended to a continuous function defined at pi = 0. A demand for a stable
epistemic utility function that is defined on the whole of ΩS and has Vi depend only on pi
cannot be satisfied.
For this choice of epistemic utility function, with b = 2, we have
∆V(p;q) =
∑
i
qi log2 (qi/pi) ,
which is the relative entropy of q with respect to p, also known as the Kullback-Leibler
discrepancy, a commonly used measure of the difference between two probability functions.
It is easy to show that epistemic utility functions that evaluate credences only in terms of
the consequences of decisions that might be made on the basis of them must be everywhere
stable. Let A be a set of acts, and let Ui(A) be the utility of choosing act A if hi. For
a credence-function q, let Aq be an act that maximizes expected utility. This gives us
Vi(q) = Ui(Aq). To say that Aq maximizes expected utility as judged by q means that∑
i
qi Ui(Aq) ≥
∑
i
qi Ui(A)
for all A ∈ A. The value of having credences p, as judged by an agent whose credence-
function is q, is
U(p;q) =
∑
i
qiUi(Ap).
Because Aq maximizes expected utility, as judged by q,∑
i
qiUi(Aq) ≥
∑
i
qiUi(Ap)
for all p, and U(q;q) ≥ U(p;q). This is true whether the utility that attaches to acts is
cognitive or practical. Therefore, approaches to cognitive utility that locate all cognitive
utility in acts of acceptance and rejection necessarily yield epistemic utility functions that
are everywhere stable.
4. The Value of Learning Theorem
There is a theorem, first published by I. J. Good (1967), and generalized by Graves (1989),
Skyrms (1990) (Ch. 4), and Oddie (1997), according to which learning can never have
negative expected value. This is true even when there is a possibility of being misled, that is,
when among the possible results of the learning experience is a move in the wrong direction,
a move away from belief in the true hypothesis, perhaps resulting in worse decisions than
those that would have been made on the basis of the pre-learning credences.6 The theorem
5 See Savage (1971), §9.4; McCarthy (1956) attributes this result to unpublished work of
Andrew Gleason.
6 For instance, an unlucky series of tosses could lead someone to think a fair coin biased.
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8says that, even when this is possible, the expected value of the learning will not be negative;
the possible negative consequences will be outweighed by the positive ones.
Good, Graves, and Skyrms evaluate learning in terms of its potential consequences for
subsequent decisions. But the value of doing an experiment, or of pursuing some line of
research, can be due, in part, to the expected increase in the value of one’s belief state.
For example, although some practical benefit might emerge from research performed at the
Large Hadron Collider (LHC), the primary reason for building it is the value of the increased
insight into the laws of nature to be gained from experimentation with the Collider. We
don’t know in advance what the outcome of experimentation with the LHC will be, of
course. It may be that the Standard Model of particle physics is confirmed; it may be that
wholly unexpected results are found, provoking a radical revision in fundamental theory.
An estimate of the value of building the LHC should be based on some assessment (perhaps
vague) of the expected cognitive utility of experimentation to be conducted with it.
Oddie (1997) showed that, for updating via conditionalization, the theorem holds if cog-
nitive epistemic values are included, with the condition that the epistemic utility functions
be everywhere strictly stable, a condition that Oddie calls cogency. The version we give here
applies, as in Skyrms, to any learning experience, not just conditionalization, and will be
phrased to highlight the minimal stability condition that is required. This will be important
in the next section, in which this condition will be justified as a reasonable requirement on
epistemic utility functions.
Suppose that Alice has an epistemic utility function V, and that she is about to undergo
an experience that may change her credences in the members of a partition {hi}. Suppose
that she will make a transition from her current credence-function cr to one of a set
{crj}. This might be through Bayesian conditionalization on new information (as in the
treatments of Good and Oddie), or through Jeffrey conditionalization (as in Graves), or
some other process; we assume only, following Skyrms, that her current credence-function
cr satisfies what Graves calls condition M (for Miller’s Principle) and van Fraassen (1984)
calls Reflection:7
cr(hi&ej) = cr(ej) crj(hi),
where ej is the proposition that the transition will be a transition to crj . Note: we are
not taking it as a condition of rationality that all changes in credence satisfy condition M ;
rather, following Skyrms, we take condition M to be a necessary condition for the transition
to count as a pure learning experience. Credence changes that don’t satisfy condition M
don’t count as learning.
If hi&ej , then the value of Alice’s post-learning credence is Vi(crj), and the epistemic
value of having had the learning experience is
Vi(crj)− Vi(cr).
Alice therefore judges the expected value of undergoing the learning experience as∑
i,j
cr(hi&ej) (Vi(crj)− Vi(cr)) .
Applying condition M this becomes∑
j
cr(ej)
∑
i
crj(hi) (Vi(crj)− Vi(cr))
7 In Skyrms’ presentation, M is for Martingale (Skyrms, 1990, 105).
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9=
∑
j
cr(ej)
(
UV(crj ; crj)− UV(cr; crj)
)
=
∑
j
cr(ej) ∆
V(cr; crj).
This is Alice’s judgment, using her current credences, of the expected change in value of her
credences due to the learning experience. However, because of condition M , it is also her
expectation value of ∆V(cr; crj), which is the change in value of her credence, as judged by
the new credence.
If V is stable at crj , then ∆V(cr; crj) ≥ 0. Therefore, if, for every j such that cr(ej) 6= 0,
V is stable at crj , each term of the sum is non-negative, and Alice’s evaluation of the
expected value of undergoing the learning experience is non-negative. It is strictly positive
if, in addition, ∆V(cr; crj) > 0 for some j such that Alice has non-zero credence that she
will end up with credence crj . Since we have shown in the previous section that practical
epistemic utility functions are everywhere stable, we get Skyrms’ version of the theorem as
a special case.
Of course, in real-life learning situations there will typically be costs associated with
undergoing the learning experience, if only an opportunity cost due to the time spent
learning. The Value of Learning Theorem does not show that learning will always have
non-negative utility, all things considered. It concerns only the contribution to the expected
utility calculation due to the change in credence.
Note that it is condition M that turns Alice’s current expectation of the change in value
of her belief state into an expectation of the change in value, as judged by the possible new
belief states. This is why a parallel argument would not establish that it would be rational
for an agent, using her current credences to make the assessment, to take a drug to change
her belief state, even though the new belief state would be judged an improvement by the
new belief state. Thus, Fallis misses the mark when he says,
In order to decide whether it is rational to take this drug, we have to use rd [the drug-
induced credence function] to calculate the expected epistemic utility of her doxastic
state if she takes this drug.... In order to conclude that it is not rational to take this
drug, we have to explicitly require that “absent any new information you should not
change your cognitive state.” EUFs [epistemic utility functions] by themselves cannot
distinguish between (a) the (scientifically acceptable) changes to one’s doxastic state that
result from performing an experiment and (b) the (scientifically objectionable) changes
to one’s doxastic state that result, for example, from taking a drug (Fallis, 2007, 231).
The requirement that belief states not be changed absent any new information is not needed
as an extra requirement, if stability is already required. This is because the decision of
whether to take the drug is evaluated on the basis of the agent’s credences at the time the
decision is made. In situations like the drug-taking decision, in which condition M will not
be satisfied, the expected utility of making the credence-shift will be negative.
The condition that V be stable at the credences that could result from the learning
process, though sufficient, is not a necessary condition for a learning process to have positive
expected value. Horwich (1982, 127–28) utilized, for a two-element partition, the utility
function of Example 2, above. Using this function, he proved that learning has positive
expected utility when the evidence to be acquired is not irrelevant to the hypothesis in
question.
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5. Are all reasonable epistemic utilities stable?
As we have seen, practical epistemic utility functions—that is, epistemic utility functions
that evaluate a belief-state in terms of its effects on subsequent decisions—are necessarily
everywhere stable. We have not thus far required this of cognitive epistemic utility functions.
Patrick Maher has pointed out that the Value of Learning Theorem does not hold for
arbitrary epistemic utility functions, or even for arbitrary truth-valuing functions, where,
for a two-element partition, {h,∼ h}, an epistemic utility function V is truth-valuing8 iff Vh
increases, and V∼h decreases, as degree of belief in h increases (this concept is generalized
in §6, below).
That an epistemic utility function be truth-valuing is not a sufficient condition for the
Value of Learning Theorem to hold for it—or, as Maher calls it, the Scientific Value of
Evidence Thesis (SVET). This fact, which Maher illustrates with a simple example (Maher,
1993, 176–77), he uses to argue for the inferiority of probabilist explanations of SVET—that
is, explanations in terms of value that accrues to belief-states, represented as probabil-
ity assignments—to acceptance-based explanations. He considers the possibility of placing
restrictions on epistemic utility functions, but rejects such a move as ad hoc.
Another possible response is to say that a utility function simply does not count as
representing the cognitive goals of science unless it makes SVET true. ... The proposed
restriction on what counts as a scientific utility function is not motivated by any reflection
on the goals of science that the utility function is supposed to capture, but merely by the
fact that the probabilist explanation fails without this restriction; thus the probabilist
restriction on what counts as a scientific utility function is quite ad hoc (Maher, 1993,
177–78).
We should ask whether one can obtain the SVET without any moves that are objectionably
ad hoc.
Let us consider an agent who has the choice of obtaining new evidence, or not, and who
has some epistemic utility function. Without any assumptions about the form this epistemic
utility function takes, we cannot conclude that, for her, conditionalizing on the new evidence
will have non-negative expected epistemic utility. Maher asks: why should we expect her
epistemic utilities be such as ensure that conditionalizing will have non-negative expected
epistemic utility?
One way to approach the question is to assume that her belief-shift upon learning new
evidence will be the shift brought about by conditionalizing on the new evidence, and ask
whether we can justify a constraint on her epistemic utility function that guarantees that
conditionalizing has non-negative expected epistemic utility. Suppose, however, that our
agent’s epistemic utilities do not satisfy any such constraint, and that, for her, conditional-
ization has negative expected utility. For such an agent, it is unreasonable to assume that
she will conditionalize; this belief-updating strategy will be regarded by her as inferior, in
the sense of having lower expected epistemic utility, to the strategy of simply leaving her
credences unchanged upon acquiring new evidence. It seems more reasonable to assume that
she will adopt some updating strategy that maximizes expected epistemic utility.
This may look as is it trivializes the Scientific Value of Evidence Thesis; if we assume
that our agent adopts an updating strategy that maximizes expected epistemic utility, the
expected epistemic utility of acquiring new evidence is guaranteed to be non-negative and
will be strictly positive except in cases in which no updating strategy has positive expected
8 Maher’s term is “truth-seeking.”
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epistemic utility. We can still ask, however: why should conditionalization have positive
expected epistemic utility?
Greaves and Wallace (2006) have shown that conditionalization maximizes expected
utility if and only if, for every ej such that cr(ej) > 0, V is stable at the conditional
credence-function cr( · |ej). Requiring that epistemic utility functions be stable, therefore,
suffices to ensure that our utility-maximizer will conditionalize.
Oddie (1997) argues for stability on the basis of conservatism, the principle that “[a]bsent
any new information you should not change your cognitive state” (p. 538). Oddie is not
alone in finding this a compelling principle; we have already quoted Earman to the effect
that violation of this principle is “nothing short of madness”. For those who agree with
Oddie and Earman, this ought to be sufficent; we require that epistemic utility functions be
stable and thereby obtain the Value of Learning result. Maher, on the other hand, regards
stipulation of stability as another ad hoc move. After pointing out the instability of the
epistemic utility function considered by Horwich (see our Example 2, above), Maher notes
that a possible response is “to say that a utility function does not count as representing the
cognitive goals of science unless it is a proper scoring rule.” However, “like the similar move
used to make SVET necessary, success is here bought at the price of invoking a completely
ad hoc assumption” (Maher, 1993, 179).
If, however, we have independent justification for conditionalization, then this will be be-
come an argument in favour of a stability condition; if conditionalization does not maximize
expected epistemic utility, our epistemic utility maximizer will run afoul of the reasons we
have for thinking that she ought to conditionalize. One such justification is the diachronic
dutch book argument. De Finetti and Ramsey showed that c(h|e) = cr(h&e)/cr(e) is the
fair price of a bet on h, conditional on e, where a bet conditional on e is one that is called
off, and all monies returned, if ∼ e. The diachronic dutch book argument (reported in Teller
(1973), and attributed therein to David Lewis) uses this to show that an agent who updates
via some strategy other than conditionalization is vulnerable to a diachronic dutch book.
This means that there is a set of bets, some offered prior to updating, some after, that the
agent will regard as all favourable, whose net effect is a sure loss.
Suppose our partition {hi} consists of propositions that are wagerable—that is, propo-
sitions whose truth-value can be ascertained, with sufficient reliability, in a short enough
time, that it makes sense to place bets on them. An agent whose belief-shift maximizes
expected epistemic utility will leave herself open to a diachronic dutch book, unless her
epistemic utility function is stable at each credence-function obtainable from her credence
by conditionalizing on some {ej} with cr(ej) > 0. Avoidance of a diachronic dutch book is a
reasonable constraint to place on a rational agent undergoing learning. Thus, for cases like
this, in which the hypotheses under question are wagerable, an epistemic utility function
that can represent the considered value judgments of a reasonable agent must be stable
at every point in probability-space that could be reached from her current credences by
conditionalization on evidence that she deems it possible to acquire. This condition is
sufficient for the Value of Learning Theorem of the previous section to apply.
Not all cases of interest will be of this sort, however. Scientific theories, if they involve
putative laws of nature, make claims with spatiotemporally unbounded import, and hence
cannot be conclusively verified by spatiotemporally bounded observation. For this reason,
there may be no satisfactory way to set payoff conditions, and no sensible way of making
bets on the hypotheses.
Even if the hypotheses in question are not wagerable, precluding a diachronic dutch book,
there is still an issue of diachronic consistency raised by unstable epistemic utilities. Suppose
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that an agent has an epistemic utility function that is not stable at cr( · |ej). Then a strategy
that maximizes expected epistemic utility will recommend some other credence function crj ,
not identical to cr( · |ej), upon learning ej . This means that, though her credence that she
will make a transition to crj is cr(ej), there is some proposition h such that
crj(h) 6= cr(h&ej)/cr(ej).
That is, her credences violate condition M .
Condition M cannot be plausibly be taken as a constraint on all rational belief-changes.
But it can be taken as a condition for a belief-change to count as a learning experience,
one in which the post-shift agent endorses her prior judgments as reasonable for some-
one in her prior epistemic condition. An agent who maximizes expected epistemic utility
in her belief-shifts cannot satisfy condition M—that is, cannot undergo a pure learning
experience—unless her epistemic utility function is suitably stable. An epistemic utility
function that can represent the considered value-judgments of a reasonable agent ought
not to foreclose the possibility of learning. This means that the epistemic utility function
ought to be stable at every credence that can be reached from the agent’s current credence-
function by conditionalization on evidence regarded by the agent as possible for her to
acquire. If this set of credence functions reaches the whole of probability space, then we
have an argument for stability everywhere.9 If not, we have argued for a condition that is
weaker than stability everywhere. But it is still sufficient for the Value of Learning Theorem.
Imposing this stability requirement, a reasonable one, and not at all ad hoc, we get the result
that obtaining evidence has non-negative utility, and has positive utility if V is strictly stable
at some credence-function that is different from the agent’s current one and might be reached
by conditionalizing on the evidence. We obtain the Scientific Value of Evidence Thesis for
epistemic utilities that include cognitive utilities, without any objectionable moves.
Some might object that it is nonsensical to place constraints on values: an agent values
whatever she values, and considerations of rationality or reasonableness cannot be applied
in a critique of values, but enter only when consideration is made of how the agent is to best
reach the goals prescribed by her values. To this, it should be pointed out that decision theory
begins with constraints on preferences between acts, motivated by rationality concerns, and
this does not seem nonsensical.
Moreover, advocates of an acceptance-based notion of cognitive utility also place con-
straints on these utilities. Maher proposes four necessary conditions for a cognitive utility
function to be counted as reflecting scientific values (Maher, 1993, Ch. 9). The first of these
is respect for truth, the condition that the cognitive utility of accepting a hypothesis when
it is false not be higher than the utility of accepting it when it is true. This does, indeed,
seem to be a reasonable condition to place on a cognitive utility function. The analogue, in
the present context, would be to require that an epistemic utility function be truth-valuing.
This, interestingly enough, turns out to be a consequence of stability.
9 There is a minor wrinkle, in that the set of experiences that can be distinguished by
the agent may only be countable. In such a case, if the set of credence-functions reachable
by conditionalization on possible evidence is dense in ΩS , we can get everywhere stability
by imposing a continuity condition on the utility function—provided that it extends to a
continuous function on ΩS .
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6. Externalism and Truth-Valuing
Oddie (1997) distinguishes between internalist and externalist epistemic value functions.
An internalist epistemic value function evaluates a belief state in terms of that state’s
structure, independently of how the world may be. It might, for example, value certainty over
uncertainty, and rank credence-functions according to some measure of how concentrated
they are. In our notation, internalism is the condition that Vi(p) be the same function for
each i. It is easy to see that, if this is the case, every credence function q will assign the
same value UV(p;q) to p, and, except for the trivial function that assigns the same value
to every p, no internalist value function can be everywhere stable, and no internalist value
function whatsoever can be everywhere strictly stable (Oddie, 1997, 537).
This shows that an everywhere strictly stable epistemic value function must be an ex-
ternalist one; it must be sensitive to the way the world is. Sensitive, but in what way? We
would expect that an epistemic value function would value having high credence in true
propositions; must this be imposed as an extra condition?
Fallis (2007) has shown that an everywhere stable epistemic utility function must satisfy a
condition that he calls weak monotonicity, which is a form of truth-valuing. To understand
what has been proven, we first need to discuss what is to be meant by a truth-valuing
epistemic utility function.
For a partition consisting of only two hypotheses {h1, h2}, there’s no difficulty in saying
when an epistemic utility function is truth-valuing. In such a case ΩS is one-dimensional,
so any change in credence is a change away from one vertex of ΩS and towards the other.
We say that Vi is truth-valuing if Vi(p) does not decrease as pi is increased, and strictly
truth-valuing if it increases as pi is increased.
For n > 2, things are a bit more complicated. Let {ei} be the vertices of the simplex
ΩS , with ei being the probability function that assigns probability 1 to hi and 0 to all other
members of S. We will want to say that Vi is strictly truth-valuing if Vi(p) increases as p
moves towards the vertex ei. And that means that we’ll have to be a bit more precise about
what it means to move towards the vertex, since, in a space of more than one dimension,
there are different paths that can be taken from one point to another.
There are a number of metrics, or distance-functions, that can be defined on ΩS . One is
the norm distance:
d(p,q) =
1
2
n∑
i=1
|pi − qi|.
This is the maximum difference in probabilities assigned by p and q to any of the 2n
propositions that can be formed from Boolean combinations of the elements of S, and hence
a natural measure of the difference between two probability assignments. The norm distance
of any probability function p from the vertex ei is 1− pi.
Another metric on ΩS is, of course, the familiar Euclidean metric,
r(p,q) =
√∑
i
(pi − qi)2.
Generalizing, we define, for any set W = {ai} of positive numbers, a weighted Euclidean
metric,
rW(p,q) =
√∑
i
ai(pi − qi)2.
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To any metric on ΩS defining a notion of distance between two probability functions,
there corresponds a notion of truth-valuing: Vi is truth-valuing at a point p iff there is a
neighbourhood of p in which Vi does not decrease as the distance to ei decreases, and it is
strictly truth-valuing if it increases with decreasing distance to ei. Vi is everywhere (strictly)
truth-valuing iff it is (strictly) truth-valuing at each point in ΩS , and the epistemic utility
function V is (strictly) truth-valuing iff every Vi is.
The notions of truth-valuing generated by different metrics need not coincide. The gen-
eralized Brier rule evaluates a credence function according to the square of a weighted
Euclidean distance from the truth, and hence is strictly truth-valuing in that metric. It is
not, however, truth-valuing in the norm distance (see Fallis 2007, 234).
We can also define a notion of truth-valuing that is independent of any consideration of
a metric on ΩS . This makes use of the fact that there is a natural affine structure on a space
of probability functions, independent of any notion of distance. For distinct points p, q, we
define the line containing p and q as the set of probability functions
(1− t) p+ t q,
where t ranges over all values compatible with remaining in ΩS . Call this line λ(p,q). We
will require of any metric on ΩS that it be compatible with the affine structure; that is, for
any admissible metric, it must be the case that the path along λ(p,q) is a path of minimal
length among paths that join p and q.
For any point p ∈ ΩS , and any vertex ei, the direct path towards ei is along the line
λ(p, ei). We will say that Vi is affinely truth-valuing at p iff there is a neighbourhood of
p in which Vi does not decrease as we move towards the vertex ei along λ(p, ei), strictly
affinely truth-valuing if it increases along this line. This is the condition that Fallis calls the
weak monoticity constraint (the condition that an epistemic utility function be everywhere
truth-valuing in norm distance he calls the monotonicity constraint).
Since, on any admissable metric, the distance between p and ei will decrease as we move
towards ei along λ(p, ei), affine truth-valuing is weaker than any of the notions obtained
from distance metrics. To be affinely truth-valuing is the weakest possible sense of truth-
valuing; if an epistemic utility function is not affinely truth-valuing, it is clear that we should
say that is not truth-valuing. The condition that an epistemic utility function be affinely
truth-valuing captures the idea that the utility function be truth-valuing in some sense.
The various metric-induced conditions impose further restrictions on what is to count on
truth-valuing. In particular, truth-valuing in norm-distance entails that, if Vi is a continuous
function, it depends only on pi; that is, the value of a belief state depends only on its degree
of belief in the true hypothesis, and is independent of the way in which credences are
distributed among false hypotheses.
There can be epistemic utility functions that are stable at some point, without being
truth-valuing. Take, for example,
Vi(p) = −p2i .
This epistemic utility function is nowhere truth-valuing, in any sense, as Vi(p) decreases
with increasing pi. It is, however, strictly stable at the probability-function that assigns
equal probability 1/n to each element of S.
Fallis (2007) proves the lovely result that any epistemic utility function that is everywhere
stable is affinely truth-valuing (this is his Proposition 1). Though Fallis does not express it
this way, his result stems from the way ∆V behaves under mixtures. Take two probability
functions p, q, and, for some α ∈ [0, 1], let
r = α p+ (1− α)q.
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Then, for any epistemic value function V,
∆V(p; r) + α∆V(r;p) = (1− α) (∆V(p;q)−∆V(r;q)) . (∗)
This relation can be readily verified by the reader.
Now take two points p, r, on a line that includes a vertex ei, with pi < ri < 1. Then r
is a mixture of p and ei, and so
r = α p+ (1− α)ei
for some α ∈ (0, 1). This gives us (1− ri) = α(1−pi) and (ri−pi) = (1−α)(1−pi). Putting
ei for q in (∗), we get
∆V(p; r) + α∆V(r;p) = (1− α) (∆V(p; ei)−∆V(r; ei)) .
But
∆V(p, ei)−∆V(r, ei) = Vi(ei)− Vi(p)− (Vi(ei)− Vi(r))
= Vi(r)− Vi(p),
and so we have
∆V(p; r) + α∆V(r;p) = (1− α) (Vi(r)− Vi(p)) .
Using (1− ri) = α(1− pi) and (ri − pi) = (1− α)(1− pi), we get
(1− pi) ∆V(p; r) + (1− ri) ∆V(r;p) = (ri − pi) (Vi(r)− Vi(p)) . (†)
Note that this is unchanged when the roles of p and r are switched; therefore, the relation
(†) holds for any p, r lying on a line that extends to the vertex ei.
From (†) the connection between stability and being affinely truth-valuing is immediate.
If V is stable at both r and p, both ∆V(p; r) and ∆V(r;p) are non-negative, and so it follows
that
(ri − pi) (Vi(r)− Vi(p)) ≥ 0.
If ri > pi, therefore, we must have Vi(r) ≥ Vi(p). If V is strictly stable at p or r, then
∆V(p; r) or ∆V(r;p) is strictly positive, and
(ri − pi) (Vi(r)− Vi(p)) > 0.
Therefore, if ri > pi, Vi(r) > Vi(p). We conclude that an epistemic utility function is
everywhere affinely truth-valuing if it is everywhere stable, and that it is everywhere strictly
affinely truth-valuing if it is everywhere strictly stable. So, not only does stability (Oddie’s
‘cogency’) entail sensitivity to the external word, it entails valuing truth.
7. Are there further restrictions on Epistemic Utility Functions?
Oddie (1997) imposes the condition that an epistemic utility function be everywhere strictly
stable, on the grounds that it is always irrational to change one’s credence in the absence
of new evidence. This is a stipulation that Maher ((1990; 1993)) rejected as ad hoc.
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In some discussions of theory choice, there seems to be a suggestion that considerations
of cognitive value have a legitimate role to play in setting credences.10 This is only possible
for epistemic utility functions that are not everywhere stable. An agent with a stable
epistemic utility function will not be moved to adjust her credences by considerations of
cognitive value.11 Rather than ruling out by fiat the possibility of permitting considerations
of cognitive value to affect our credences, we should ask whether an argument can be given
for excluding this possibility. The considerations of §5 show that unstable epistemic value
functions can run into problems of diachronic coherence, but they fall short of an argument
that an epistemic value function must be everywhere stable. The argument only extends
to stability at every point in probability space that can be reached by conditionalization
on possible evidence. One could imagine, for example, that among the hypotheses in S are
two hypotheses {h1, h2} such that the likelihoods cr(e|h1) and cr(e|h2) are the same for
all evidence e that the agent deems it possible to obtain. This means that conditionalizing
on evidence will not change the ratio of cr(h1) to cr(h2) (this is the probabilistic version
of underdetermination). This is the sort of case in which epistemic utility might be called
upon to set this ratio. One could imagine an epistemic utility function that is stable only
for credence functions that assigned a certain value α to cr(h1)/cr(h2).
12 An agent whose
credences did not have cr(h1)/cr(h2) = α would be moved to change them to one that did.
But, once achieved, this condition would be preserved under conditionalization on possible
evidence, and so the agent would not run afoul of the considerations of §5. It is worthwhile
10 This statement is hedged because, though this is often suggested by such discussions
(including Kuhn’s), one rarely finds a clear statement, for the simple reason that it is often
not clear what choices are under consideration. Putnam, for example, writes that “a great
number of theories must be rejected on non-observational grounds, for the rule ‘Test every
theory that occurs to anyone’ is impossible to follow” (Putnam, 2002, 140). Judgments of
theoretical virtues such as coherence and simplicity are, according to Putnam, the grounds
on which some theories are rejected out of hand. “In short, judgments of coherence, sim-
plicity, and so on are presupposed by physical science. Yet coherence, simplicity, and the
like are values” (Putnam, 2002, 142). It is not clear from this whether rejection entails low
credence, or whether we are to choose not to bother with theories that lack the requisite
virtues, whatever our credence in them might be.
11 It might be suggested that there is a role for epistemic utilities in setting priors, even
if the epistemic utlity functions are everywhere stable. Instead of imagining an agent who
already has credences and is considering whether it is in her interest to change them, we
might consider the problem of endowing a tabula rasa with credences in the first place. On
this sort of proposal, prior credences might be ranked according to U(q;q). Unfortunately,
for everywhere strictly stable epistemic utility functions, picking a prior q that maximizes
U(q;q) leads to dogmatism. Since every Vi achieves its maximum at ei, the maximum value
of U(q;q) is achieved at the vertex that maximizes Vi(ei).
12 Are there any such functions? It is easy to show that such functions exist, though
whether there are any that are plausible is another matter. Let VS be any everywhere
strictly stable epistemic utility function, and let T be an invertible transformation of ΩS
that leaves only probability functions with the desired condition invariant. Define V by
Vi(p) = V
S
i (T −1p).
Then UV(p;q) =
∑
i qiV
S
i (T −1p) is uniquely maximized by p = T q, and so V is stable
only on the subset of ΩS of invariant points of T .
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to ask whether some other argument could be given for everywhere stability, that did not
simply presume that it is always wrong to let considerations of epistemic utility affect one’s
credences. An open question: is there a No Wishful Thinking theorem?
Besides stability, another constraint that might be considered is that epistemic utlity
functions be truth-valuing according to one’s favourite metric. Fallis considers imposing the
condition that epistemic utility functions be truth-valuing in norm distance, on the grounds
that this captures the requirement that scientist should “seek the truth and nothing but
the truth” (Fallis, 2007, §7). This is a strong constraint. In particular, it entails that Vi(p),
if it is a continuous function, depends only on pi. The only epistemic utility functions that
satisfy this condition and are strictly stable are of the form,
Vi(p) = ai + logb pi,
where b > 1. This, according to Fallis, is an unreasonably tight restriction.
The logarithmic rule is almost certainly a scientifically acceptable EUF. In fact, as I
discuss below, it has several very attractive properties. However, it is not clear why a
scientist who seeks the “truth and nothing but the truth” should be required to have this
particular attitude toward epistemic risk. In other words, Bayesian models of epistemic
utilities seem to place unreasonably tight restrictions on a scientist’s attitude toward
epistemic risk in this context (Fallis, 2007, 237).
Fallis concludes from this that “Bayesian models of epistemic utilities fail as normative
accounts of scientific inquiry” (240).
This is a strong conclusion. Is it warranted? It is certainly true that the requirement
that Vi(p) depend only on pi is more constraining than might at first appear. One possible
reaction to this would be to conclude that a seemingly reasonable requirement that leads
to such consequences is not as innocent as it appeared, and that it is in fact too restrictive
a condition. This seems to be the right reaction; there are no compelling arguments for the
requirement, and respect for the truth does not require one to be indifferent as to how one’s
credences are distributed among false hypotheses. Another reaction might be to “bite the
bullet,” as Fallis says (237), and accept that the logarithmic rule is the only scientifically
acceptable epistemic utility function. If need be, the Bayesian’s teeth could be strengthened
by arguments for the logarithmic rule that rest on considerations other than stability (see,
e.g., Good 1973, 116–118). This would be the appropriate reaction if there were good reasons
to require that Vi(p) be truth-valuing in norm distance.
An analogy: imagine someone who found it prima facie plausible to suppose that there
are everywhere strictly stable epistemic utility functions that are not truth-valuing, on the
grounds that it is not clear why a scientist who is content with her own epistemic state should
be required to value belief in the truth. This person is then confronted with Fallis’ theorem,
and is surprised to learn that no such utility functions exist. The reasonable response, it
would seem, would be to abandon the thought that there should be such utility functions,
and that a requirement that there be such functions, despite its prima facie plausibility, is
in fact impossibly strong. It would be unreasonable to throw out the framework.
8. Conclusion
In §5, it was argued that epistemic utility functions that can represent the considered judg-
ments of a reasonable agent ought to be stable at each point in probability-space that could
be reached from the agent’s current credences by conditionalization on possible evidence. It
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would be good to have an argument for a stronger claim, that there is something unreason-
able about having epistemic values that are not everywhere stable, but such an argument,
it seems, would have to proceed along entirely different lines. Nevertheless, the stability
condition argued for is strong enough to establish the Value of Learning Theorem, opening
the way for consideration of cognitive epistemic values, in addition to values associated with
acceptance and rejection of hypotheses, to play a motivating factor in science.
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